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I. INTRODUCTION
Bruce Springsteen, icon of the working class 1 and well-known resident of the Third
Circuit,2 might have to put his pen to paper and pick to guitar once again in chronicling a new
wrinkle in the plight of the workingman. However, Mr. Springsteen, the fittingly named
"Boss,"3 would be venturing into "the treacherous waters of the [United States] Supreme Court's
labor law successorship doctrine[,]" which has a "history of bedeviling courts" and fellow
bosses4 alike. 5 The two most recent courts to be bedeviled by the successorship doctrine are the
neighboring Second and Third Circuits. Their respective holdings in Local 348-S v. Meridian
Management Corp. and AmeriSteel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters created a

split between the circuits regarding the duty of successor employers to arbitrate. 6
The successorship doctrine is set forth in a trilogy of United States Supreme Court
decisions, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 7 NLRB v. Burns International Security
Services, Inc., 8 and Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees9 (collectively, the

"Successorship Trilogy" or "Trilogy"). These cases outline the duties imposed on a successor
employer by an existing collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the predecessor

1

Chet Flippo, Blue-Collar Troubadour, PEOPLE, Sept. 3, 1984, at 68.
Bruce Springsteen, 'We Are a Confused But Noble Race ... ', N.J. MONTHLY, Nov. 15,2010,
http://www.njmonthly.com/articles/lifestyle/people/we-are-a-confused-but-noble-race.html.
3
Oliver Brett, What's in a nickname?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2009, 1:29PM),
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/78290 13 .stm.
4
I.e., employers and labor unions.
5
AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264,267 (3d Cir 2001); Local348-S v. Meridian Mgmt.
Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (Livingston, J., dissenting); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor
Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. REv. 203,203 (1993) ("Courts have struggled
repeatedly to defme the legal obligations of the buyer of a business that has unionized workers.")
6
See generally Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Successor Employers Bound By Prior Collective Bargaining
Pact, 242 N.Y.L.J. 83 (Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that Meridian creates a split with the Third Circuit).
7
376 U.S. 543 (1964) (holding that a successor employer could be bound to arbitrate with an incumbent union if
substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise exists).
8
406 U.S. 272 (1972) (noting that a successor employer is not automatically bound to the substantive terms of the
CBA between the predecessor employer and the incumbent union).
9
417 U.S. 249 (1974) (holding that if substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise does not exist, a
successor employer will not be bound to arbitrate with an incumbent union).
2
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employer and incumbent labor union.

10

However, Wiley and Burns have been viewed as

standing in "direct conflict" with one another and have created a "tension ... in this trilogy,"
which Howard Johnson, the last case of the three, does not resolve. 11
The two main unresolved issues of the trilogy, with whichAmeriSteel and Meridian
struggle, are whether ( 1) an unconsenting successor employer has a duty to arbitrate any disputes
with the incumbent union under the terms of the pre-existing CBA and (2) "the issue of whether
and to what extent [the unconsenting successor] is bound by the [pre-existing CBA's] terms." 12
Regarding the first issue, in AmeriSteel, the Third Circuit arrived at the correct result by not
requiring the successor to arbitrate after hiring the majority of the surviving predecessor's
employees, but did so using logic that the dissent viewed as "flatly contradict[ing] the holding of

Wiley." 13 In contrast, in Meridian, the Second Circuit does require such arbitration, but does so
by relying too heavily upon the "substantial continuity of identity" factor established in Wiley.
In doing so, it has set a dangerous precedent that will incentivize "would-be successor employers
to simply [not hire] the unionized employees and start over." 14
Forcing new employers to arbitrate under the terms of an old CBA, whenever "substantial
continuity of identity" in an existing workforce is present, will cause employers to refrain from
rehiring unionized employees, so that they can "elude the grasp of the successorship doctrine." 15
Adopting Meridian's approach will cause new employers to "weigh the benefits of retaining
experienced workers with the possibly lengthy pitfalls of litigating, appealing, arbitrating, and

10

See generally Flumenbaum, supra, at 83 (discussing successor employer obligations).
AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 268,270.
12
Meridian, 583 F.3d at 66.
13
AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 281 (Becker, C.J., dissenting).
14
Meridian, 583 F.3d at 86 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
15
Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (Meskill, J., dissenting).
11
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potentially relitig(lting" when a duty to arbitrate is imposed on them. 16 Furthermore, choosing
not to hire the predecessor's unionized workers, in an attempt to avoid a duty to arbitrate, will
lead to inexperienced workers occupying these newly vacant positions, potentially resulting in an
inferior work product and a greater probability of vicarious liability arising from employee
negligence. 17 As a consequence, more skilled laborers would be unemployed, leading to greater
industrial strife and social turmoil. 18 Therefore, from a public and economic policy standpoint, it
would be more beneficial, in terms of long-term effects, not to impose a duty to arbitrate on
successor employers in all instances.
This Comment proposes, in a similar vein as Judge Livingston's dissent in Meridian, that
a bright-line rule be imposed, requiring a duty to arbitrate under the terms of a pre-existing CBA
(1) when a successor employer has implicitly or explicitly assumed the contract, (2) when a

successor employer is an alter ago of the predecessor, (3) when a successor employer is a
product of a merger with the predecessor, by which the predecessor ceases to exist, or (4) when
both the "substantial continuity" test is satisfied and another analogous basis exists for imposing
contractual liability (e.g., supporting state law). 19 In developing this argument, Part II sets forth
the policy of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and describes the collective bargaining
process. This section also discusses the limitations placed on private employers and labor unions
by the NLRA, the purpose and status of a CBA, and the impact of the duty to bargain when
placed on employers. Part III then addresses the Supreme Court precedent on a successor
employer's duty to arbitrate by discussing the Successorship Trilogy. Part IV turns to the current

16

Kevin A. Teters, Case Note, Successor Employer's Obligations Under a Preexisting Collective Bargaining
Agreement: The Second Circuit Misinterprets Supreme Court Decisions and Sets a Harmful Precedent, 76 J. AIRL.
& COM. I43, I50 (2011).
17
Wilson McLeod, Rekindling Labor Law Successorship In an Era ofDecline, II HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 27I, 299
(I994).
18
See, e.g., Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549; Burns, 406 U.S. at 282.
19
See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 84 (Livingston, J., dissenting).

4

split between the Courts of Appeals and the existing conflict in the Trilogy. Finally, Part V
urges the Courts of Appeals to adopt a bright-line rule in imposing a duty to arbitrate on
successor employers because such a rule would balance competing interests and conform to the
parties' reasonable expectations.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of the National Labor Relations Act and CBAs
The main body of labor law governing collective bargaining between private employers
and employees is the NLRA. 20 The NLRA grants employees the right to affiliate themselves
with labor unions and to bargain collectively with employers via unions or self-chosen
representatives. 21 The fundamental purpose of collective bargaining is to establish wages, hours
of employment, and other conditions of employment.22 These negotiated terms, rights, and
duties of the parties are then organized into and agreed to by both parties in a written contract
known as a CBA,23 which governs the relationship between labor unions and employers?

4

Under United States law, CBAs are not treated like ordinary contracts; rather, they enjoy
an exalted status. 25 A CBA is "more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad
of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. "

26

The CBA covers the complete

employment relationship and "calls into being a new common law- the common law of a
particular industry or of a particular plant.''27 Despite the fact that a CBA is created by two

29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (2000).
29 u.s.c. § 157.
22
29 u.s.c. § 159.
23
29 u.s.c. § 158(d).
24
Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 197
(1989).
25
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
26
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-579 (1960) (citing Dean
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and the Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1004-05 (1955)).
27
!d. at 579.
20

2

l
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parties, it is by no means "in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship." 28
Under normal contract principles, a successor employer would not be bound to a predecessor's
contract without consent. 29 However, a CBA "is not an ordinary contract" and can be imposed
on a successor employer.30
In two well-defined scenarios, a successor employer is obliged to honor the pre-existing
CBA. First, when it has expressly or impliedly assumed the CBA31 and, second, when it is
simply an "alter ego" of the predecessor employer. 32 A successor employer will be bound when
it expressly assumes the CBA by voluntarily agreeing to the terms of the pre-existing CBA. 33
Likewise, when there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that a successor employer has
impliedly agreed to be bound by the CBA, the successor is bound by the former CBA. 34 For
example, in Audit Services, Inc. v. Rolfson, 35 a successor employer that continued making trust
fund contributions on behalf of union workers and not doing so for non-union workers was
bound to the CBA because it displayed a pattern of conforming to the terms of the CBA.
In the second scenario, under the "alter ego" doctrine, the successor employer is "merely
a disguised continuance of the old employer."36 Instances where a successor employer is in fact
an alter ego of the predecessor "involve a mere technical change in the structure or identity of the

28

Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
!d.
30 !d.
29

31

Southward v. South Cent. Ready Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487,493 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[I]fa successor voluntarily
assumes the obligations of its predecessor's CBA, then it will be bound by its predecessor's CBA.")
32
Meridian, 583 F.3d at 79 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
33
In Re Plaza Mission Bottling Co., 14 B.R. 428 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (President of the subsequent company
expressly stated at a meeting held prior to the formation of the new company that he would continue to observe the
terms and conditions set forth in the CBA); United Steelworkers of America v. Deutz-Allis Corp., No. 86-0166-CVW-0, 1986 WL 6852, (W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1986) (successor announced in a letter that it had assumed the labor
contract).
34
See, e.g., NLRB v. Pine Valley Div. of Ethan Allen, Inc., 544 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1976) (successor employer
continued to deduct union dues and made contributions to union's welfare account from employee paychecks,
therefore successor conformed to the terms of the CBA).
35
641 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981)
36
Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
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employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws, without any substantial change
in ownership or management."37 The factors considered are whether the two entities have
substantially identical stockholders, officers, directors, management, operations, equipment, and
customers.38 An example of an alter ego successor relationship is when a family-operated
business passes from the patriarch to another family member, who is also involved in operations,
and that successor attempts to define the business as a new and separate entity .39 Because the
new business entity shares the same management and is substantially identical to the
predecessor, it would be found to be an alter ego. 40 However, the duties of successorship beyond
these two situations are contested.

B. Overview ofan Employer's Duty to Bargain

In order to initiate the collective bargaining process that results in a CBA, the NLRA
imposes a duty to bargain on employers when a majority of their employees are represented by a
labor union. 41 Even after the parties agree upon the terms of a CBA, the employer remains
bound to negotiate and bargain by this duty throughout the relationship between the parties. 42
For instance, an employer cannot make a unilateral change to any condition or requirement
included in the CBA without notifying the union and providing it with an opportunity to
negotiate. 43

37

Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at261 n.5.
Railroad Maintenance Laborers' Local1274 v. Kelly Railroad Contractors, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 889, 896 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("Important factors to consider are whether the two entities have substantially identical management, business
purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervisors and ownership ... The substantial continuity of the work
force is frequently a major issue in alter ego determinations.")
39
See generally Midwest Precision Heating and Cooling, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.3d 450 (8th Cir. 2005).
40
ld at459.
41
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
42
Union-Tribune Pub. Co., 353 NLRB No.2, at *12 (2008).
38

43

!d.
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However, successor employers are not always held to the duty to bargain when a
predecessor employer transfers its business to the successor. 44 Even outside the two clear
instances discussed, the duty to bargain as a successor employer arises when an employer
acquires an organized business and there is "continuity of the business enterprise" between the
old employer and new employer.

45

In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 46 the

Supreme Court put much confusion to rest regarding a successor employer's duty to bargain by
establishing a factor-based test to determine the necessary "continuity of identity of the business
enterprise."47 The existence of substantial continuity in the context of assessing a duty to bargain
is determined by looking at: (1) whether the business of both employers is essentially the same;
(2) whether the employees of the new company are doing the same jobs in the same working
conditions under the same supervisors; and (3) whether the new entity has the same production
process, produces the same products, and basically has the same body of customers.48
Since successorship obligations will not be imposed when these factors are not met by a
successor employer, a savvy employer therefore may attempt to avoid satisfying these factors,
most notably by not hiring a majority of the predecessor's unionized employees in order to evade
the duty to bargain. 49 However, the refusal to hire an employee because of union membership
constitutes an unfair labor practice, in violation of the NLRA. 50 Accordingly, unions sometimes
claim that the absence of a majority of the predecessor's employees in the successor's work force
to be attributable to discriminatory hiring by the successor. 5 1

B. Glenn George~ Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 279 (1988).
Id
482 u.s. 27 (1987).
47
Meridian, 583 U.S. at 74.
48
Id; Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43.
49
George, supra, at 290.
50
29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3).
51
George~ supra~ at 290.
44

45
46
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C. Overview ofArbitration's Role in Labor Law
As comprehensive as a CBA might be, it is virtually impossible to provide for every
contingency. Inevitably, disputes between the union and the employer will arise. 52 Usually, the
parties acknowledge this reality and provide for an arbitration clause in the CBA, so that these
disputes can be resolved through a grievance process culminating in binding arbitration. 53
Arbitration has played a central role in effectuating national labor policy, 54 and it is federal
policy to resolve labor disputes arising out of a CBA through arbitration.

55

Arbitration has been

described as "the substitute for industrial strife," and as "part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself. "56

Ill. THE SUCCESSORSHIP TRILOGY
A. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston
In Wiley, the Supreme Court first introduced the idea that a successor employer could be
bound by an arbitration clause in a CBA between the predecessor employer and its unionized
employees. 57 In that case, Interscience Publishers, Inc. ("Interscience"), the predecessor
employer, merged with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ("Wiley"), and ceased to do business as a
separate entity. 58 Prior to the merger, an AFL-CIO union had represented certain Interscience
employees and had entered into a CBA with Interscience. 59 After the merger, Wiley retained all
oflnterscience's employees, but failed to recognize the union as a bargaining agent or fulfill any

52

Jared S. Gross, Note, In Search ofWiley: Struggling to Bind Successor Corporations to Their Predecessor's
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 29 OKLA. CITYU.L. REV. 113, 117 (2004).
53
Paul Trapani, Note, Old Presumptions Never Die: Rethinking the Steelworker's Trilogy Presumption of
Arbitration in Deciding the Arbitratability ofSide Letters, 83 TuL. L. REV. 559, 559-560 (2008).
54
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.
55
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
56
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549; Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., supra, at 578.
57
AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 268.
58
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 545.
59
!d. at 544.
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obligations llllder the Interscience CBA.

60

The union then brought suit against Wiley to compel

arbitration under the CBA, claiming that Wiley was bound by the agreement's arbitration
provision.

61

Wiley argued that it was never a party to the CBA and that the merger effectively

terminated the Interscience CBA. 62
The Supreme Court concluded that Wiley had a duty to arbitrate with the union under the
pre-existing CBA. 63 In arriving at that decision, the Court laid the groundwork for determining
whether a successor employer has a duty to arbitrate. It held that "[s]ubstantial continuity of
identity in the business enterprise" before and after the change must exist in order to require
arbitration under the pre-existing CBA. 64 In Wiley, the Court regarded the "wholesale transfer of
Interscience employees to the Wiley plant, apparently without difficulty[,]" as satisfying the
"substantial continuity" condition. 65 However, the Court left the "substantial continuity" concept
undefined, leaving lower courts confused as to whether a duty to arbitrate was limited to the
merger context, and as to what was "substantial" enough when a business continued after a
change in ownership. 66
However, it should be noted that state successor liability law helped buttress the decision
to require Wiley to arbitrate. 67 The Court looked to New York Corporation Law, which holds
that a merged corporation is liable on all contracts of both predecessor corporations.68 While

60

ld at 545-546.
Id at 545.
62
Id at 547.
63
Meridian, 583 F.3d at 68.
64
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551.
65 ld
66
See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 74; AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 268.
67
!d. at 548.
68
See ld; Meridian, 583 F.3d at 80 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
61
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"the Supreme Court did not rely principally on common law successor liability rules in Wiley, it
did refer to those principles as a partial explanation for its result." 69
Wiley also reiterated general principles of national labor policy, the role of arbitration,
and the status of CBAs in forming its opinion. 70 The Court held that national labor policy
favored arbitration as the means of settling labor disputes. 71 Arbitration is a means of protection
against industrial strife and is a central component in the CBA relationship. 72 Thus, the Wiley
Court believed that, in examining successor employer disputes, a balancing test must be applied
that attempts equally to protect employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship
and unconsenting employers from being bound to a contract to which they were not a party. 73
The Court stressed that under the principles of law governing ordinary contracts, an
unconsenting successor could not be bound, but that a CBA is "not an ordinary contract" since
national labor policy recognizes its importance. 74

B. NLRB v. Burns International Security Services
In Burns, the Court did not address whether a duty to arbitrate existed; instead, it looked
to whether a successor employer could be bound by the substantive terms of the previous CBA. 75
In Burns, Wackenhut Corporation ("Wackenhut") provided security protection services for
Lockheed Aircraft Service Co. ("Lockheed") at one of its plants under a one-year service
agreement. 76 Once the contract had expired, Lockheed called for bids from various companies
supplying these services, and Burns International Security Services, Inc. ("Burns") outbid

69
70

Meridian, 583 F.3d at 81 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.

71

Id
Id
73
Id at 550.
74 Id
75
AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 269.
76
Burns, 406 U.S. at 274.
72
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Wackenhut, winning the security contract.

77

Burns hired a majority ofWackenhut's employees

already employed at the plant, but refused to honor the existing CBA between Wackenhut and
the incumbent union. 78 The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board (''NLRB"), and the NLRB ordered Burns to honor the Wackenhut CBA. 79
In its decision, the Supreme Court first found that Burns had a duty to recognize and
bargain with the incumbent union because a majority of the employees hired were already
represented by a union as a bargaining agent and the bargaining unit was unchanged. 80
According to the Court, "[t]he source of [Burns'] duty to bargain with the union is not the CBA
but the fact that it voluntarily took over a bargaining unit that was largely intact." 81
Second, the Court held that the successor employer, Burns, could not be bound against its
will by the substantive terms of the pre-existing CBA. 82 In reaching this decision, the Court
stated that Section 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act83 and legislative history of labor
laws hold that "although successor employers may be bound to recognize and bargain with the
union, they are not bound by the substantive provisions of a [CBA] negotiated by their
predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by them." 84 While recognizing the general principles
underlying labor disputes, the Court held that the goal of preventing industrial strife did not
override the "bargaining freedom of employers and unions." 85 It reasoned that binding a
successor employer to the substantive terms of a pre-existing CBA could result in "serious

77

/d. at 275.
!d. at 276.
79 !d.
80
!d. at 280-281.
81
!d. at 287.
82
/d. at 282.
83
29 uses§ 158(8)(d).
84
Burns, 406 U.S. at 274.
85
!d. at 287.
78
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inequities. "

86

One such inequity is the restraint on the flow of capital because potential

employers would be unwilling to rescue failing businesses if they cannot negotiate their own
CBAs. 87 Finally, the Court held that contract terms between employers and unions should
"correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties." 88 Therefore, forcing successor
employers into unconsented contracts would offset the "balance of bargaining advantage. " 89

Burns provides ambiguous direction for the lower courts because it partially contradicts
Wiley and does not address whether an arbitration clause comprises one of the substantive terms
of a CBA. 90 Wiley establishes that an unconsenting successor employer may have a duty to
arbitrate with an incumbent union, by which means the substantive terms of the pre-existing
CBA may be implicitly imposed on the successor. 91 In spite of this, Burns holds that an
unconsenting successor employer cannot be bound to the substantive terms of a pre-existing
CBA, even if substantial continuity of identity exists. Such a holding leaves courts wondering if
it is still acceptable to force successors to arbitrate and potentially be found liable for the CBA. 92
Despite the glaring contradiction, the Court managed to provide some clues in
reconciling the cases. The Burns Court suggested that Wiley occurred against a backdrop of state
successor liability law, providing guidance on what, in addition to substantial continuity, is
influential in compelling arbitration. 93 Furthermore, the Court has identified two levels of
liability for successor employers, the duty to arbitrate and the obligation to adopt substantive
terms of a previous CBA. Burns provides guidance regarding the heightened duty to adopt a
prior CBA, which typically occurs when the CBA provisions are assumed and under the alter ego
!d.
/d. at 287-288.
88
!d. at 288.
89 !d.
90
AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271.
91
!d. at 270.
92 !d.
93
Burns, 406 U.S. at 286.
86
87
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doctrine, and distinguishes the substantial continuity factor and how it applies to the successor's
duties. 94
C. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees
Two years after Burns, Howard Johnson took up the issue of labor law successorship
with many hoping that the Supreme Court would clear up the conflicting reasoning of Wiley and

Burns. 95 However, they were disappointed because the Court refused to "decide ... whether
there [was] any irreconcilable conflict between Wiley and Burns."96 Instead, Howard Johnson
simply answered the question of whether a new employer had a duty to arbitrate in a fact pattern
that contrasted with Wiley. 97 Where Howard Johnson succeeds is in its ultimate outcome and
reiteration of salient factors to be used in determining where a successor employer has a duty to
arbitrate.
In Howard Johnson, Grissom, the predecessor employer, agreed to its sell equipment and
lease its restaurant and motor lodge, which had all been operated by Grissom, to Howard
Johnson. 98 Howard Johnson did not agree to the CBA between Grissom and the incumbent
union and hired only nine out of 53 of the union-represented, former Grissom employees. 99 The
union then filed an action against Howard Johnson citing its failure to hire all of Grissom's
employees as an illegal "lockout." 100 The union sought to compel Howard Johnson "to arbitrate
the extent of [its] obligations to the Grissom employees under the bargaining agreements."

94

/d. at 282; 287.
See AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271.
96
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at256.
97
AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271.
98
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 251.
99
/d. at 251-252.
100
Id at 252.
101
Id at 252-253.
95
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101

In arriving at a decision, the Court chose to compare the salient distinctions between the
facts presented in Wiley with the facts of the case at hand. 102 First, it emphasized the fact that
Wiley involved a merger, "as a result of which the initial employing entity completely
disappeared."

103

In contrast, Howard Johnson only involved the sale of some assets, and the

original employer remained in existence. 104 This distinction was significant because, in Wiley,
state successorship liability law "embodied the general rule that in merger situations the
surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." 105
Recognition of such state liability law supports a finding of a duty to arbitrate because it "may
have been fairly within the reasonable expectations of the parties." 106
Second, the Court stressed the importance of the fact that, in Howard Johnson, the former
employer continued to exist, and accordingly the union "[had] a realistic remedy to enforce their
contractual obligations[,]" whereas, in Wiley, the former employer ceased to exist, thus making
arbitration essential between the union and the successor employer. 107 Third, and most
important, in Wiley "the surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing
corporation[,]" where in Howard Johnson, the new employer "hired only a small fraction of the
predecessor's employees." 108
Accordingly, the Court found that, based on these factors, there was no substantial
continuity of identity in the business enterprise before and after Howard Johnson became the
new employer. Therefore, Howard Johnson had no duty to arbitrate under the CBA. 109
Furthermore, the Court shed additional light on the scope of the "substantial continuity" factor,
102

Meridian, 583 F.3d at 71.
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at257.
104 !d.
105
!d. (quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 286) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
!d. at 257.
107 !d.
108
!d. at 250, 258 (original emphasis included).
109
!d. at 263.
103
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in emphasizing that it includes "a substantial continuity in the identity of the work force across
the change in ownership." 110 The Court held that the requisite continuity of the work force was
present in Wiley because a ''wholesale transfer" of employees occurred between employers;
however, Howard Johnson does not meet this requirement because only a minority of employees
were hired by the new employer. 111

Howard Johnson did not make great strides, in terms of advancing and clarifying the
successorship doctrine. Howard Johnson chose not to deal with the conflict of Burns and Wiley,
and "instead walked a very narrow path." 112 However, aside from its shortcomings, Howard

Johnson did constructively underscore the importance of"substantial continuity." Howard
Johnson's main contribution was its holding that a lack of substantial continuity would place a
case outside the ambit of Wiley. 113 Howard Johnson merely applied the principles in Wiley to a
situation where substantial continuity was easily recognized as not being present. In Howard

Johnson, the Court "simply pointed out that, consistent with Wiley, and on Wiley's own terms,
the lack of substantial continuity meant that the Court needed to look no further" in determining
whether a successor must submit to arbitration against its wil1. 114 Howard Johnson
acknowledged and reinforced the policy outlined in Burns, in maintaining that a successor may
be bound to arbitrate, but it will not be automatically bound to the substantive provisions of the
predecessor's CBA or have any obligation to hire the predecessor's employees.
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IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In the wake of the Successorship Trilogy, lower federal courts have had no difficulty

following Burns' mandate, in finding that unconsenting successor employers are not bound by
the substantive terms of their predecessors' CBAs. 116 However, they have struggled with
reconciling the holdings of the three Supreme Court cases. 117 Specifically, the courts have
struggled with applying the duty to arbitrate to successor employers. 118 In AmeriSteel, the Third
Circuit emphasized Burns, in finding no duty to arbitrate on successors despite the "substantial
continuity of identity" factor being satisfied. 119 The Third Circuit held that continuity is
necessary but not sufficient to find a duty to arbitrate, and, in light of Burns, no substantive terms
can ever be imposed by an arbitrator, thus rendering arbitration futile. 120 Later, the same
problem presented itself to the Second Circuit in Meridian, where a circuit split was created after
the court held that "substantial continuity of identity" was sufficient in finding a duty to arbitrate
for the successor. 121 The following section will explain the current circuit split and how these
lower federal courts interpreted the conflict in the Trilogy.

A. AmeriSteel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
In AmeriSteel, AmeriSteel Corporation ("AmeriSteel"), a successor employer, purchased
various assets of Brocker Rebar, the predecessor employer, including a manufacturing facility. 122
A CBA existed between Brocker Rebar and its employees' union, but AmeriSteel repeatedly
insisted that it was not bound to it and therefore, had no duty to arbitrate under its terms. 123
However, AmeriSteel hired the majority of the union employees who had worked for Brocker
116
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Rebar and, thus, was obligated to bargain with the union. 124 Bargaining broke down between the
parties, and AmeriSteel refused to recognize the union. 125 Thereafter, the union requested
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the CBA. 126 AmeriSteel refused and sought to
enjoin the union from proceeding to arbitration with AmeriSteel as a party. 127
The Third Circuit attempted to navigate the Successorship Trilogy by examining each
case individually.

128

In reviewing Wiley, the court found the holding to be limited to the merger

context in which a predecessor employer disappears. 129 The Third Circuit then went on to
identify "substantial continuity of identity" to be a necessary ingredient in finding a duty to
arbitrate, yet not the sole factor in forcing a successor to arbitrate with the incumbent union. 130
The court held that Howard Johnson did not resolve the conflict between Wiley and
Burns, but believed that Howard Johnson did, however, make known the Supreme Court's focus

when comparing Wiley and Burns. 131 Howard Johnson took "an expansive view of Burns,
repeatedly extolling [Burns'] reasoning" and "downplay[ing] the significance of Wiley.'' 132 In
reading the Trilogy, "Burns ... provides more persuasive guidance than the limited holding in
Wiley." 133 In holding Burns in higher regard than Wiley, the court found that, if an unconsenting

successor were held to arbitrate under an existing CBA, "the substantive terms of the CBA could
be enforced, and thus Burns cannot survive intact." 134 In applying Burns, the court found that
AmeriSteel could not be bound by the substantive terms of the CBA; therefore no arbitration
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award granted to the union, which necessarily would be based on the substantive terms of the
CBA, could receive judicial sanction. 135 Thus, AmeriSteel could not be obligated to arbitrate, as
the arbitration would serve no purpose. 136 Since there is an inability to hold successor employers
to the substantive terms of a former CBA, AmeriSteel was found to have no obligations under
the Brocker Rebar CBA. 137

B. Local 348-S v. Meridian Management Corp.
In Meridian, Meridian Management Corporation ("Meridian") was awarded a contract by
the Port Authority ofNew York and New Jersey to provide engineering and janitorial services at
the Jamaica Air Train Terminal at John F. Kennedy International Airport. 138 Meridian elected to
subcontract the janitorial services to Cristi Cleaning Services, Inc. ("Cristi") under a one-year
contract. 139 At the time Meridian and Cristi entered the subcontract, Cristi had an existing CBA
with a labor union representing its janitorial employees. 140 Meridian later lawfUlly terminated its
subcontract with Cristi and decided to perform the janitorial services itself.

141

In doing so,

Meridian chose to retain the majority of the Cristi employees who had previously worked at the
terminal. 142 The incumbent union then requested that Meridian recognize it as the bargaining
representative for the employees. 143 Meridian declined to do so and, in addition, refused to make
CBA-mandated contributions to the union's Health and Welfare Fund.

144

The union sought to

compel Meridian to submit to arbitration as required by the CBA. 145 Meridian, however, argued
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that it was not a party to the CBA, and it should not be bound by any of its terms, including the
arbitration clause. 146
The Second Circuit followed AmeriSteel' s methodology in first analyzing each case in
the Successorship Trilogy to find whether Meridian was required to arbitrate the issue of whether
and to what extent it was bound by the former CBA. 147 However, unlike AmeriSteel, the Second
Circuit determined the emphasis of the Trilogy to be the "central role of collective bargaining
and arbitration in furthering the goals of national labor policy- specifically by avoiding
industrial strife and encouraging the peaceful resolution of labor disputes." 148 In particular,
Meridian found the protection of workers from sudden changes in the employment relationship
to be of paramount importance when examining the successorship doctrine. 149
The majority in Meridian placed supreme importance, when considering whether a duty
to arbitrate exists, on the issue of whether there existed substantial continuity of identity of
business enterprise, with a singular emphasis on the composition of the work force. 150 With this
in mind, the court held that the duty to arbitrate should not be limited to mergers, as in Wiley, and
contended, instead, that continuity of identity can occur in a variety of situations. 151 The court
noted that Meridian hired the majority ofCristi's employees, who continued doing the same
work in the same location that they had done for Cristi, and, therefore, found that there was a
"substantial continuity of identity" between Meridian and Cristi. 152 Further, the court
highlighted that the employees had worked for Meridian the entire time, even though Meridian
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had no legal relationship with the workers, because Meridian was the general contractor when
Cristi was performing under the subcontract between the parties. 153
In considering these facts, the court found that, while Meridian's status as a successor
employer does not automatically bind it to the substantive terms of the pre-existing CBA, it
maintained substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise, including the composition of
its work force, and, therefore, was required to arbitrate with the union under the terms of the
former CBA. 154 Sufficient "indicia of substantial continuity" existed, so the issue of the extent to
which a successor employer is bound by the substantive terms of a former CBA becomes a
question for the arbitrator. 155 The court held that once submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator is
"to bring his informed judgment to bear" in which, if any, of the provisions of the CBA will be
imposed on the successor employer. 156 However, the court did not suggest any criteria for
deciding this question, but did note that the arbitration procedure will follow the terms of the
arbitration clause in the predecessor's CBA, so long as one exists. 157 The court found that
enforcing a duty to arbitrate is the "most effective way to balance those interests recognized by
the Supreme Court[,]" and is more effective than anything attempted or accomplished by the
parties privately bargaining new terms to govern the relationship. 158
The court concluded by recognizing and rejecting the Third Circuit's reasoning in

AmeriStee/. 159 According to the Second Circuit, AmeriSteel "eviscerates the protection of
employees represented by incumbent unions" and contradicts the holding of Wiley.
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V.ANALYSIS

While Meridian properly upholds the principle, expressed in Wiley, that an unconsenting
successor employer can be bound to arbitrate under appropriate circumstances, the court errs in
holding that a "substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise" is the only factor to
consider in determining whether a duty to arbitrate exists. On the other hand, AmeriSteel
ultimately provides the proper outcome in the circuit split, in holding that a successor is not
bound to arbitrate when only a "substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise" exists.

AmeriSteel correctly identifies "substantial continuity" as a "necessary ingredient," yet not the
sufficient condition for finding a duty to arbitrate in a successor employer. 161 However,

AmeriSteel fails to advance that logic in formulating its ultimate solution that no duty to arbitrate
exists, and instead, contradicts Wiley, in forming an overbroad conclusion "that an arbitration
clause of a CBA can never be enforced against an [unconsenting] successor." 162 AmeriSteel
finds that the duty to arbitrate, found to be enforceable in Wiley, should not have been ordered
because unconsenting successors cannot be forced to arbitrate when it will serve no purpose. 163
In fmding that, as a logical consequence of Burns, a duty to arbitrate would be futile for
unconsenting successors, AmeriSteel implies that Wiley has been overruled by Howard Johnson
and Burns. 164 However, the Supreme Court has never acknowledged overruling Wiley in either

Burns or Howard Johnson, and only the Court or Congress may overrule its precedent, 165 not the
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Court of Appeals.

166

Therefore, AmeriSteel arrives at a proper conclusion in not imposing a duty

to arbitrate, but does so using flawed reasoning.
On the other hand, Meridian properly recognizes Wiley's continued vitality, but
erroneously applies and interprets its holding. Meridian "confuses the circumstances in which a
'successor employer' has a duty to recognize and bargain with a labor union, with much more
limited circumstances in which that employer is bound to arbitrate with a union under a [CBA] to
which it has not agreed." 167 In Meridian, the court held that the successor employer is obligated
to arbitrate after simply meeting the "substantial continuity" test, which is the same standard
applied in imposing a duty to bargain with an incumbent union. 168 This interpretation would
render the duty to bargain valueless because unions would have no interest in negotiating a new
CBA, when an obligation to arbitrate, which would hold the successor to substantive terms of the
old CBA, is imposed. Consequently, all successor employers who hire the bulk of a
predecessor's employees would have a duty to arbitrate the extent to which they are bound by the
prior CBA. 169

In forming a proper solution to the question of when successor employers should be
obligated to arbitrate, the courts should flrst look to long-established standards, where successors
have been held to the terms of the CBA. 170 In doing so, a bright-line rule should be formed,
which categorizes the various scenarios in which a duty to arbitrate will be found. A bright-line
rule would, to a large degree, remove the confusion of the lower courts in applying the
successorship doctrine. Under such a rule, a duty to arbitrate should be found when the
successor employer: (1) implicitly or expressly assumes the CBA, (2) is an alter ego of the
166
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predecessor, (3) merges with the predecessor employer, in a scenario where "substantial
continuity" exists and the predecessor ceases to exist, or (4) satisfies both the "substantial
continuity" test and another successor liability basis strongly favors and supports a reasonable
expectation for imposing liability (e.g., supporting state law). 171
Under the first two scenarios, the assumption of the CBA and the alter ego doctrine, the
circuits widely agree that a successor employer adopts the former CBA, and, thus, a duty to
arbitrate must naturally follow, along with all other obligations of the former CBA. 172 The last
two categories of the bright-line rule, however, are not as established as the former categories,
and have never been a primary basis for imposing the entirety of the CBA on a successor
employer. Historically, however, such factors have been considered to be important
circumstances in finding a duty to arbitrate. 173
Absent a finding of an alter ego successorship or assumption of the contract, the
centerpiece of the analysis of when a successor can be bound to arbitrate is a finding of
"substantial continuity of identity of the business enterprise." 174 In Wiley, once the Court
concluded that "substantial continuity" existed, it looked to other factors, such as common law
successor liability rules, to support a duty to arbitrate. 175 Furthermore, in Howard Johnson
nowhere does the Court state that "substantial continuity" is the sole basis for finding a duty to
arbitrate. 176 Thus, the successorship doctrine treats "substantial continuity" as a "necessary but

not sufficient condition for concluding that a successor employer is bound to arbitrate under a
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predecessor's CBA. " 177 As previously mentioned, in analyzing "substantial continuity of
identity of business enterprise" the Fall River factors must be satisfied, and, as noted in Howard

Johnson, a particular emphasis is placed on the "continuity of work force." 178

In the merger context, so long as "substantial continuity" is satisfied and the predecessor
employer completely disappears, a successor employer will have a duty to arbitrate. It is equally
significant that the predecessor ceases to exist after the merger because, in the absence of the
former employer, the union loses the party against whom they can bring employment disputes.
The survival of the predecessor employer is key to protecting the interests of the workers
because the union will have a "realistic remedy to enforce their contractual obligations" against
the surviving former employer. 179 Thus, merger, in this context, would erase the former
employer and the workers' ability to resolve disputes; therefore the successor employer should
retain a duty to arbitrate, so that the workers' rightful expectations are preserved.
Finally, a duty to arbitrate should also be found also when both "substantial continuity" is
met and common law successor liability rules exist, which support a reasonable expectation that
the successor employer would be liable for the contract. 180 In Wiley, the Court emphasized that
the state law background rule supporting liability for the successor employers under predecessor
contracts was important to the result. 181 Such background successor liability rules, when
sufficiently strong, can create a reasonable expectation of continuing liability; thus support exists
for the central "substantial continuity" factor, in finding a duty to arbitrate. Each of the cases of
the Trilogy refers to the state law background as support to "substantial continuity,"
demonstrating the Court has used this factor as a partial explanation in finding a duty to arbitrate
177
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and, also, does not consider "substantial continuity" to be an exclusive factor in determining
when a duty to arbitrate exists. 182
Chief Judge Becker, dissenting inAmeriSteel, offered an alternate reconciliation of the
Trilogy, suggesting a "sliding scale" approach for determining what can be imposed on
successors. 183 He proposed that by using the Successorship Trilogy as a guide, burdens, ranging
from no obligations to the imposition of an entire CBA, should be imposed on successors based
on the corresponding strength of the successor relationship. 184 The dissent seems to base the
"sliding scale" test mainly on the presence of a merger or sale of assets, not as much on
continuity of work force, thus ignoring the central consideration in imputing a duty to arbitrate
identified in Howard Johnson. 185 A "sliding scale" approach fails for multiple reasons. First,
such a test is exceedingly imprecise, and especially in an unsettled area. 186 Second, due to its
malleability, a sliding scale can be easily abused and used as an excuse for pushing forward
various policy agendas by either pro-labor union or pro-employer courts. Third, there are only
three tiers in the sliding scale (i.e., a duty to bargain, a duty to arbitrate, and an adoption of the
terms of the predecessor's CBA); thus, the sliding scale ignores the standards for each of these
obligations already established by the Supreme Court.
By imposing a duty to arbitrate on successor employers solely based on the "substantial
continuity" factor, Meridian complicates an already widely recognized problem in
successorship. 187 A finding of "substantial continuity" already imposes a duty to bargain on a
successor; however, by Meridian's holding, such a ftnding now imposes, not only a duty to
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bargain, but also a duty to arbitrate. Imposing a duty to arbitrate in this context has a dangerous
effect on the transactions by which a successor takes control of another business. An employer
can become a successor and potentially become exposed to obligations, via a variety of
transactions, such as a partial sale or total sale of assets, a lease, a subcontract, a competitive
bidding process, a leveraged buyout, a stock purchase, or even a bankruptcy sale. 188 Thus,
according to Meridian, in a multitude of common and frequent transactions, the heavier burden
to arbitrate could now attach to a new employer, so long as "substantial continuity" is fulfilled.
Even under the lesser burden to bargain, a trend of "union-avoidance" has previously been
recognized in successor employer transactions. 189 Thus, by imposing a harsher duty to arbitrate
on successors, Meridian exacerbates this risk, and, in turn, hurts the same labor unions and
workers it attempts to protect in imposing a duty to arbitrate on successor employers. 190
Successor employers "have no legal obligation to hire the old unionized employees or to
even give them preference in hiring - even if the entity plans to continue doing the exact same
work." 191 So long as the successor hires a minority of the old unionized employees or less, the
successor will not be bound by the CBA, nor will it even be compelled to recognize or bargain
with the union at al1. 192 In effect, Meridian "[increases] the incentives for would-be successor
employers to simply fire the unionized employees and start over[.]"
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Such an outcome "is

hardly a manifest victory for the cause of organized labor[,]" since it effectively devastates the
very industrial peace and employee interests that the court lauded as an overriding policy
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Further~

the NLRA's antidiscrimination provision, Section 8(a)(3), which was designed

to protect unionized workers from anti-union behavior, has been largely ineffective. 195 While "a
new employer cannot refuse to rehire the old employees solely because they are in a union ...
employers will often be able to find ample business reasons to justify refusing to rehire old
employees." 196 A mass non-hiring of predecessor union employees is typically not taken as
sufficient in finding a discriminatory dismissaL 197 Instead, there must be direct and substantial
evidence of anti-union sentiment by the successor employer, and this kind of evidence is seldom
available from sophisticated employers. 198 Thus, although perhaps suspicious, a successor
employer has the right to refuse to hire an experienced, unionized work force, in favor of
unskilled employees without violating Section 8(a)(3). 199 Not only will such behavior displace
skilled laborers causing industrial strife, strikes, and increased unemployment, but also will
result in social turmoil and additional expenses for the employer. 200
Even in avoidance of the lesser duty to bargain, successor employers have gone to great
lengths by incurring added expenses and devising strategies to avoid hiring predecessor
employees. 201 When skilled laborers have been dismissed in favor of a largely inexperienced
work force, so that successor liability is avoided, a greater number of laborers are needed to do
the jobs of former employees, resulting in lower productivity and greater inefficiency. 202 For
example, at a meatpacking plant, where union workers were replaced by inexperienced laborers,
the substitutes were 90% slower and turned out to be so incompetent that the meat had to be
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destroyed. 203 Such problems can also result in unnecessary expenses for the successor in
defending a garden-variety of tort claims, such as product liability and workplace injuries,
increased training expenses of inexperienced workers, and recruiting expenses in finding
substitute employees. Thus, Meridian, creates a greater incentive for anti-union hiring behavior,
so that "substantial continuity" is not apparent, and all union obligations associated with a CBA,
to which the new employer was not a party, can be avoided.
Moreover, a duty to arbitrate could deter employers from even venturing into a successor
transaction. The imposition of a duty to arbitrate may discourage and inhibit the transfer of
capital. 204 Corporations may be reluctant to acquire other businesses if they believe they might
be saddled with the other corporation's CBA.205 Additionally, by imposing a duty to arbitrate,
under the same standard used to find a duty to bargain, the obligations found in arbitration may
not correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties.206 Instead, when "substantial
continuity" is satisfied, it is best to balance the bargaining advantage between employers and
unions by the economic powers of the parties. 207 Labor policy is ill-served by binding parties to
terms that do not correspond to the economic strengths of the parties. 208 For example, by
imposing a duty to arbitrate, a union may be forced to retain terms that were made to a smaller
employer, that are customized to those particular circumstances, and which it would not want
imposed if a larger or more financially robust firm should acquire the business?
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Under such a

scenario, a duty to bargain would better serve both parties rather than a duty to arbitrate.
Therefore, unwanted consequences likely will result from the imposition of Meridian's
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erroneous holding, which imposes a harsher duty to arbitrate under the same standard as a duty
to bargain.
VI. CONCLUSION
The successorship doctrine has long proven itself to be difficult to navigate, causing
courts to confuse successor obligations, standards used to impose requirements, and national
labor policy responsibilities. Therefore, unless the Supreme Court revisits this unclear area of
law, the lower courts should adopt a bright-line rule, which firmly establishes when a duty to
arbitrate should be imposed on successors. A bright-line rule eliminates subjective, and
sometimes biased, pro-labor union or pro-employer interpretations of the Successorship Trilogy,
which have further deepened the rift between the courts in applying a duty to arbitrate. Just as
the Court set forth a factor-based test in imposing a duty to bargain, the same methodology
should be applied to the duty to arbitrate, so that confusion can similarly be resolved. A brightline rule serves to create and enforce expectations of both labor unions and successor employers,
where the parties will then enter certain transactions with the understanding of the unavoidable
duties and liabilities that come with the territory. Thus, unionized workers' interests will be
preserved when changes present themselves in innocuous employer transitions, and successor
employers will be fairly held to anticipated duties and liabilities. In turn, a great deal of the
"union avoidance" gamesmanship, naturally resulting from Meridian, will be stopped dead in its
tracks, so that successors can continue to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with labor unions, where
the employer gets the benefit of a highly-productive and skilled labor force and the work force
can fairly bargain the terms of such employment.

In effect, the toils and trials of the workingman would not be solved in their entirety;
however, an unnecessary hemorrhaging of secured unionjobs can be avoided, thus preserving
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another day and avoiding another dilemma in "the working, the working, just the working
life."2IO
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